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The recent growth of the coal seam gas industry has increased pressure on regional 
communities. Debate surrounding the industry is intense and a social licence to operate has yet to be 
granted to the industry in its entirety. This article presents an analysis of social issues surrounding 
the coal seam gas industry, making comparisons between two case studies: the Ranger and Jabiluka 
mines and the Yandicoogina mine. It presents the results of a desktop study, focussed on three topics: 
community identity; procedural justice and distributive justice, which provides a means for 
comparison and draws attention to central concerns. It is found that: power imbalances; changing 
community identities; potentially inequitable distributions of long term benefits and the process to 
distribute those benefits and negative perceptions of the industry as a whole serve to undermine the 
provision of a social licence to operate by communities and has the potential to impose significant 




The Australian coal seam gas, henceforth CSG, industry is predicted to undergo rapid 
expansion in the coming decades, potentially resulting in significant macroeconomic benefits. 
However, the rate of expansion combined with increased access to shared resources, and potential 
negative environmental and social impacts, have led to significant concerns being raised, 
particularly by members of communities that are most affected by CSG expansion. There are 
compelling environmental and social reasons to ensure that negative impacts from CSG extraction 
are minimised or offset. Likewise, there is also a compelling business case since exhaustive 
negative impacts may mean that CSG companies will be unable to gain a social licence to operate, 
and thereby, face the risk of  project delays, community activism or decreased reputation (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006; Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004; Humphreys, 2000; Kemp, Bond, Franks, 
& Cote, 2010; Minerals Council of Australia, 2005). 
This article discusses how a social licence to operate may be granted in the context of the 
Australian CSG industry and is informed by deriving lessons from two historical case studies: the 
Ranger and Jabiluka mines and the Yandicoogina mine. It discusses the concept of a social licence 
to operate as identified in prior work and then focuses on the potential social impacts of current and 
future CSG activities across three key concepts: community identity; procedural justice and 
distributive justice. Through a literature review, these concepts have been identified as the most 
prominent issues within the present day activities of CSG extraction, which parallel with the 
historical activities from the case studies. 
In the analysis presented, these three themes have been viewed through an analytical lens of 
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social inequality (Langton & Palmer, 2003; O'Fairceallaigh, 2004; Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2007; 
Sorensen, 1996) tied in with neo-liberalism (Howlett, Seini, McCallum, & Osborne, 2011) and 
macro-economic development (O'Fairceallaigh, 2007). There currently exists a social inequality 
between CSG companies and those impacted by CSG extraction, which manifests itself in change 
of community identity experienced by those impacted by the CSG industry. Due to the predicted 
macroeconomic contribution made by the CSG industry in terms of exports, those community 
members impacted by CSG extraction have little faith in procedural justice to close this social 
inequality gap. Due to the lack of distributive justice, there is a feeling amongst community 
members impacted by CSG extraction that the social inequality gap could be exacerbated. The sum 
of these issues means that the CSG industry risks not having a social license to operate drawing 
parallels to the historical case studies. While these issues have been discussed previously, this 
presents the first time that links have been drawn between uranium mining and attempts to gain a 
social licence to operate from traditional landowners with the current attempts by CSG companies 
to gain a social licence to operate by agricultural landowners.   
As it will be discussed, there are key similarities between the CSG industry and case studies 
at a fundamental level. Each focuses upon a community or communities which are subject to the 
resource extraction industry and promised development benefits as compensation for extraction 
activities occurring on their land. However, the affected communities are given little right to refuse 
the development outright, only to object. Additionally, each extractive activity posed risks of 
permanent damage to the local environment, risking future economic and social activities in the 
area. These similarities correspond to the themes of community identify, procedural justice and 
distributive justice. 
This analysis provides a link between the case studies and the CSG industry, despite their 
different social, historical and operational contexts. While such lessons regarding both the case 
studies and a social licence to operate are not new, many have not yet been adapted to the CSG 
industry context and there is a disparity between what is known as best practice and general practice 
in the industry. CSG tenements inherently have a large spatial scale, and therefore, impact on a 
significant proportion of rural communities. While this analysis looks at the domestic CSG 
experience, the rise of similar, non-conventional gas industries globally means that analysis of 




CSG extraction is the withdrawal of gases, a significant proportion of which is methane, from 
coal seams usually found 200-1,000 metres below ground. CSG extraction is, at times, compared 
with other types of unconventional gas extraction, such as extraction of shale gas, despite their 
geological and technical differences. Australia’s CSG extraction began with ten wells in the early 
1990's (Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, 2011); however, 
Australia’s CSG extraction is to undergo a significant production increase, with twenty thousand 
wells expected to be drilled over the projected forty to fifty year life of the industry (Rural Affairs 
and Transport References Committee, 2011). This represents a 33 fold increase from the number of 
wells drilled as of 2009-2010 (Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, 
2011). 
Current proved and probable CSG reserves comprise of over 51% of the total gas reserves in 
Australia. A vast majority of those reserves are located in the Surat and Bowen basins, with 23% 
and 25% respectively, while smaller reserves are found elsewhere in Queensland and New South 
Wales (McLennan Magasanik Associates, 2009). Development of these reserves is to coincide with 
the development of an export liquefied natural gas industry. It is expected that industry will export 
between ten and forty mega-tonnes of liquefied natural gas per annum and will generate in excess of 
$850 million in royalties per annum for the Queensland State Government (Department of 
Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, 2009). 
Despite its potential economic benefits, concerns have been raised about the Australian CSG 
industry’s negative environmental and social impacts. A position statement issued by the National 
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Water Commission (2010) outlined some of the major concerns surrounding the industry in regards 
to water. These include: impacts of excessive extraction of water on, possibly already over allocated, 
ground and surface water systems; depressurisation of coal seam aquifers and the impacts on other 
water users and the environment; pollution from associated water disposal; connection and cross-
contamination between aquifers due to hydrologic fracturing and changes to beneficial use 
characteristics of aquifers due to the re-injection of associated water. These examples highlight the 
link between environmental and social impacts. The Commission also warned that the uncertainty 
and potential long-term significance of water impacts may disrupt current land-uses, leading to 
greater socio-economic issues. 
The Rural Affairs and Transport References Committee, tasked by the Australian Senate to 
investigate the impacts and benefits of the CSG industry, echoed these concerns. In its interim 
report (Rural Affairs and Transport References Committee, 2011), it emphasised the conflict and 
marginalisation felt within CSG affected communities. Additional focus was placed on the CSG 
industry's comparatively short life span, totalling only forty to fifty years, after which agriculture is 
likely to return as a major driver of the local economy. The Committee suggested that CSG 
activities should not risk the long-term sustainability of these vital agricultural, food-producing 
communities. It also noted that public concern had grown in the past five years alongside the rapid 
growth and community intrusion by the industry and that this debate had become highly polarised. 
Irrespective of the debate, plans to expand the industry continue (Department of Employment, 
Economic Development and Innovation, 2009; Rural Affairs and Transport References Committee, 
2011). 
Such concerns raised about CSG extraction parallel some of the concerns that have 
historically been raised about established resource extraction, which led to the International Institute 
of Environment and Development publishing the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development 
report (International Institute for Environment and Development, 2002). Since then, obtaining a 
social licence to operate has been given a greater priority in the extractive resource sector 
(Gunningham, et al., 2004). Within the Australian extractive resource sector, a social licence to 
operate refers to an unwritten contract regarding the acceptability of company actions in the 
community (Minerals Council of Australia, 2005). From the perspective of members of the 
community this often means addressing issues such as minimising negative impacts, providing 
benefits and handling grievances in a satisfactory manner. There is a compelling business case for 
establishing a social licence to operate, since poor relations may lead to: project delays; increased 
business risk; community activism; poor corporate image and conflict, all of which have the 
potential to impose significant costs upon companies (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Gunningham, et 
al., 2004; Humphreys, 2000; Kemp, et al., 2010; Minerals Council of Australia, 2005). Although 
more recent work argued that merely obtaining a social licence to operate does not result in the full 
realisation of benefits to a community (Owen & Kemp, 2013); the risks associated with not gaining 
a social licence to operate remain. 
The concept of a social licence to operate has been studied theoretically and empirically 
within the context of the extractive resources sector. From a theoretical standpoint, obtaining a 
social licence to operate is often described within a hierarchical framework where company-
community relations transition from lower to high positions starting with the social licence to 
operate being withheld from companies, to approved by communities, then acceptance of company 
activity by communities and finally a psychological identification with company activities by the 
community (Thomson & Boutilier, 2011). An alternative transition is from legitimacy, by providing 
an economic and broader social benefit, to trust, both in terms of listening to grievances and shared 
value (Boutilier & Thomson, 2011). These theoretical frameworks have been supported by 
empirical research, which highlights that: a social licence to operate needs to be earned and not 
issued (Lacey, Parsons, & Moffat, 2012); contains inherent intangible qualities (Franks, Cohen, 
McLellan, & Brereton, 2010); has conditions that are dynamic (Thomson & Boutilier, 2011) and 
requires both technical and social processes (Brereton & Parmenter, 2006). 
An underlying feature of this theoretical and empirical research is the concept of a shared 
maturity journey taken by companies and communities. Since the CSG industry is relatively new to 
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Australia, it is sensible to limit the scope of this article to the early stages of this journey, which 
correspond to the lower levels of the hierarchical frameworks identified above. This article will 
focus on the transition from a social licence to operate being withheld from companies, to approved 
by communities, or the transition from economic and social legitimacy being denied by the 
community to being recognised by the community. Within the early stages of this journey, three 
prominent themes have been identified: first, community identity: a shared trait or set of traits 
which exist in the minds of people, allowing the perception of a community group (Jenkins, 2004); 
second, procedural justice: the equity of mechanisms through which decisions are made (Brereton 
& Parmenter, 2006) and third, distributive justice: the degree in which the allocation of outcomes is 
fair (Brereton & Parmenter, 2006). These themes represent three key areas of conflict between 
resource extraction operations and communities: identifying who companies should be working 
with; establishing inclusive decision-making with communities and identifying the how the benefits 
of operations are distributed. These three themes are described in detail below. 
First, Jenkins (2004), Veiga, Scoble, and McAllister (2001) and Kapelus (2002) discussed the 
need to identify or define communities affected by resource extraction activities. Community 
identity is a complex idea, being defined both by the community itself, though a unifying trait or 
ideal and also externally by a company choosing which groups of people to engage or consult with 
(Kapelus, 2002). While Veiga et al. (2001) suggested that “a mining community is one which is 
significantly affected by a nearby mining operation” (pp. 191-192), community identification may 
not be so simple in practice. The identity of a community can come from any number of shared 
traits (Kapelus, 2002) and because of its ambiguous nature, identifying a community solely upon 
geographic or socio-economic assertions, rather than the dynamic and illusive shared identity upon 
which it may actually be based, could cause or exacerbate conflict in community-industry relations 
(Jenkins, 2004). Dalby and Mackenzie (1997) suggested that communities can be shaped, fractured 
or formed in opposition to a perceived threat, meaning that the presence of a new, external entity, 
such as a resource extraction company, may change and shape existing communities. 
Second, the degree to which the relevant members of the community are involved in decision-
making is an important factor impacting community-industry relations (Kemp, Owen, Gotzmann, & 
Bond, 2011) and the provision of a social licence to operate. The justice of mechanisms used in 
decision-making is referred to as procedural justice (Brereton & Parmenter, 2006). Kellert, Metha, 
Ebbin, and Lichtenfeld (2000) argued that a lack of procedural justice may lead people to contest 
externally controlled management decisions, turning to more community based natural resource 
management. Their analysis outlined five shared characteristics of community natural resource 
management programs, which are: involving local institutions in resource management; 
empowering local authority; reconciling socio-economic development and environmental 
conservation; legitimising local land rights and including traditional knowledge into resource 
management. 
Third, Kemp et al. (2011) found that a key factor regarding conflict in communities affected 
by resource extraction has a basis in an inequitable distribution of risks, benefits or impacts; the 
process to ensure this is referred to as distributive justice. Much like procedural justice, the degree 
in which this distribution is fair plays a large role the provision of a social licence to operate 
(Brereton & Parmenter, 2006). It is often commented that resource extractive industries are able to 
make a contribution to their local community through employment and investment (Department of 
Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, 2009). However, in development literature, 
this idea is controversial. Langton and Mazel (2008) highlighted how inequality in the distribution 
of resource extraction benefits to Indigenous communities had the potential to disadvantage rather 
than empower affected communities as a whole, since a lack of capacity building in regards to 
human capital can lead to an exacerbation of negative impacts right through the life cycle of the 
extraction operation. For example, investments in playgrounds, housing or road infrastructure may 
not benefit the community unless it increased the capacity of local people to reach their 
development goals. This point was further explored by Ross (1999) who discussed how it is 
possible to create 'linkages' between sectors and non-resource sectors in order to provide long-term 
benefits in relation to economic growth. However, such benefits must be nurtured through suitable 
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institutions or risk the creation of a resource curse (Boschini, Pettersson, & Ronie, 2007). 
This theoretical and empirical research has informed the mining industry, both in terms of 
informing the corporate social responsibility or shared value strategy of individual companies and 
through best practice publications such as the Minerals Council of Australia’s Enduring Value 
document (Minerals Council of Australia, 2005). Despite this, there is little literature covering these 
topics in the context of the CSG industry, possibly because CSG is relatively new to Australia 
compared to the more traditional commodities such as gold, nickel, coal or iron ore. This presents a 
knowledge gap to which this article will make a contribution to fill. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This article presents a series of lessons, derived from established Australian resource 
industries, that could be applied within the CSG context. It was informed by a desktop literature 
review of the current social impacts stemming from CSG extraction on agricultural communities 
and the historical social impacts from uranium mining on Indigenous communities. While the depth 
of insight provided by a desktop literature review may be limited compared to other research 
methodologies, such as semi-structured interviews (Petkova-Timmer, Lockie, Rolfe, & Ivanova, 
2009) or anthropological research (Ballard & Banks, 2003), this presents the first study between the 
social impacts of CSG extraction on agricultural communities and the social impacts from mining 
on Indigenous communities Prior to this, it was unknown if these links existed. As such, this work 
should be viewed as a scoping study, which provides the platform for further more in-depth study 
on the issues raised. 
It is important to note the difference in scale when discussing the impacts from the CSG 
industry and the case studies. Extracting methane from a coal bed uses a different process than 
traditional mining. Impacts from mining are often analysed as point source impacts from a single 
mine site. In contrast, the impacts from individual CSG wells are often insignificant and, therefore, 
impacts from CSG extraction should be considered as the cumulative sum of many smaller, diffuse 
sources over a large land mass. Therefore, this work considered the possible impacts of the CSG 
industry holistically across a region, rather than an individual well or company. This was an 
approach that aligned with other research (Williams & Walton, 2013) and work that argues specific 
technology may need to acquire a social licence to operate (Franks, et al., 2010). Although, this 
presented its own problems relating to generalisations across the broad spectrum of opinions, 
perceptions, actions and circumstances within the industry and affected communities. However, 
there was still a strong case to identify important points and applicable lessons to be learnt and 
adapted by the CSG industry. 
The findings of this research were informed by two literature reviews. The first literature 
review was carried out on the social impacts of CSG and was performed in two steps. In the first 
step, due to the small quantity of published academic literature on the socio-economic impacts of 
the CSG industry, 1,755 newspaper and televised news articles from twelve news sources with 
national or local circulation were analysed via a text analytics tool, Leximancer, to derive the main 
themes from sources. Leximancer identified and analysed keywords within the articles, then 
grouped them into broad themes based upon how frequently they co-occur and displayed this 
information in a concept map that was used to manually identify key ideas and their relationships 
within the text. Leximancer has been used to identify similar themes in the resource and other 
sectors using the same approach (Cretchley, Rooney, & Gallois, 2010; Dann, 2010; Rooney et al., 
2010; Sonter, Barrett, Moran, & Soares-Filho, 2013). 
A second literature review was carried on the social impacts stemming from the Ranger and 
Jabiluka mines and Yandicoogina mines. This review had a more diverse scope than the first since 
material is available from a more diverse range of sources, such as journal articles and Government 
reports, with those discussing the specific mines chosen for the literature review. These three mines 
were chosen as they presented a defining moment in the resource industry’s relationship with 
landholders and a highly vocal opposition movement, which is not often seen in the mining sector. 
These issues parallel the current situation in the CSG industry, which has struggled with its 
relationship with agricultural land owners and faces a vocal opposition to its existence. While this 
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methodology is ultimately subjective, in practical terms it is similar to alternatives such as 
identifying key themes from surveys or interviews of community members. In the second step, a 
literature review on a subset of the original collection of articles was undertaken to develop a deeper 
understanding of the issues underlying each theme. 
 
FINDINGS 
The coal seam gas industry 
The media reviewed showed a clear discourse of community-industry conflict surrounding 
issues related to the environmental and social impacts relating to CSG interactions with water 
sources, particularly in relation to the agricultural industry (Chubby, 2011; "Queensland farmers 
furious at freeze on CSG exploration in towns", 2011; "Tweed Shire Councillors say no to gas 
mining", 2011). Another reported area of conflict identified was the process by which land rights 
were negotiated, with concerns regarding unethical negotiation tactics and/or power imbalances 
between the parties (Caton, 2011; "Farmers need to be aware of their rights", 2011; Jacinta, 2011; 
McKenna & Owens, 2010). At the time, gas companies accessed land based on attaining private 
landholder permission for each individual property. This dictated where gas wells, and the 
subsequent direct environmental impacts, could occur. 
However, the views depicted in media may not be completely representative of the numerous 
and diverse views held within a community. Evidence of conflict at a local level, especially in the 
coverage of events, such as protests ("Charter to protect landholder's rights", 2011; Harlum, 2011; 
McMillan, 2011; Woodburn, 2011), may suggest that at least some segments of the community 
disputed specific issues or a social licence to operate had not been granted.  Regardless, how the 
media represented the industry was important in itself. Many articles generalised the industry in 
essence, perceiving it as one cumulative management structure (Arthur, 2011; "Farmers need to be 
aware of their rights", 2011; "Farmers want ban on coal seam gas exploration", 2011; Klan, 2011; 
Salusinszky, 2011; Vogler, 2011). A sentiment that the CSG industry was being forced upon large 
sections of communities was evident (Nicholls, 2011; O'Brien, 2010; "Them's fighting words", 
2011). This effectively marginalised people in their own towns and properties. 
 
Ranger and Jabiluka mines 
The discovery of, and pressure to develop, world class uranium deposits in the proposed 
Kakadu National Park area during the 1960's and early 1970's led the Commonwealth Government 
to establish the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry, often called the Fox Report, with the task 
of investigating the economic, environmental and community impacts of development from a 
uranium mine in the area (Wellings, 2002). In 1977, the Fox Report recommended that the Ranger 
mine be allowed to be developed for to the national benefit, against objections from the Traditional 
Owners. However, it expressed concerns surrounding the impact upon the local Indigenous 
populations, specifically in the areas of employment, education, race relations, health and alcohol 
abuse (Wilson, 1997). Negotiations were held with Traditional Owners, resulting in a historic land 
use agreement in which 2.5% of the mine's production value was to be paid to the Gagudju 
Association, a group founded to receive and distribute royalties to its members directly and through 
services (Wellings, 2002). However, its success was short lived and by the early 1990's the Mirarr 
people, whose legislated, Native Title land was 50% occupied by the mine lease, became critical of 
the mine on the grounds that it negativity affected the community and because of concerns about the 
proposed second mine, Jabiluka (Scambary, 2009), which had been held back by Commonwealth 
Government policy. Around the same time, uranium price fluctuations affected royalty payments 
causing the Gagudju Association to cut its services and benefits to members, which added to the 
pressure on the community at the time (Wellings, 2002). 
Following this initial conflict, issues between the Mirarr people and the Gagudju Association 
escalated, as disputes over royalty payments and the legitimacy of Traditional Owner rights 
emerged (Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation, 1999). This conflict, along with others in the area, 
served to undermine the power of the community to resolve problems, with payments, resources 
and decisions being split or contested between the Gagudju Association and the Mirarr owned 
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Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation. One example where community conflict caused significant 
issue was the Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation's decision not to participate in the Kakadu 
Regional Social Impact Study due to the involvement of Energy Resources Australia, the operator 
and leaseholder of the Ranger and Jabiluka mines (Collins, 2000). 
Although only the Ranger mine was in operation in the area, the social impacts on Aboriginal 
communities had been significant. The Aborigines and Uranium Report (Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal Studies, 1984, p. 299) found, “the current civic culture is one in which disunity, neurosis, 
a sense of struggle, drinking, stress, hostility, of being drowned by new laws, agencies, and agendas 
are major manifestations.”, adding that it was a society in crisis. However, the report noted that 
many social issues were present in communities before the development of the Ranger and Jabiluka 
mines. It also found mining companies in the local area made genuine attempts to employ members 
of the local Indigenous population, without success. 
In a demographic assessment of the Indigenous population in the Kakadu region, Taylor (1999) 
found that from 1980 until 1999, the number of employed individuals, houses built, income 
received and school enrolments increased in absolute terms. However, unemployment rates, the 
level of welfare dependence, the degree of overcrowding and education achievements remained 
constant. This suggested that, according to traditional development indicators, the Indigenous 
population had not improved their socio-economic status despite the presence of the Ranger and 
Jabiluka mines. Critically, it also found that their socio-economic status was similar to that of the 
Indigenous populations in neighbouring communities. 
This could have been partially explained by the cultural characteristics of the area which 
made it difficult to facilitate housing, long term employment or education for the Indigenous 
population, such as high regional mobility or low labour force participation (Taylor, 1999). For the 
Mirarr people, the loss of Indigenous characteristics was tantamount to a ‘genocidal’ act upon their 
culture (Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation, 1999), which was linked to the danger that 
environmental disturbance posed to the living tradition of Indigenous people. The idea that place 
and person are inseparable was prevalent and environmental loss or damage, along with sense of 
helplessness from not being able to influence it, may have been a major contributor to the social 
impacts in the area (Katona, 2005). The Mirarr people were concerned that if the Jabiluka mine was 
to reopen, it would result in the destruction their culture (Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation, 1999). 
Rio Tinto, the owners of Energy Resources Australia, stated that it did not support further 
development of the Jabiluka or Ranger mines, at least in the short term (Katona, 2005). 
 
Yandicoogina mine 
The Yandicoogina Land Use Agreement, henceforth YLUA, signed in 1997 between the 
Hamersley Iron company and the Niapaili, Bunjima and Innawonga peoples of the Central Pilbara 
region was the first agreement of its type negotiated after the Mabo Indigenous land rights ruling 
(Senior, 1998). It allowed construction of the Yandicoogina iron ore mine to go ahead and provided 
community compensation through a system similar to that of the Ranger mine in the Kakadu region 
(Scambary, 2009). The Gumala Aboriginal Corporation was created and designed to provide mining 
benefits to Traditional Owners through conventional methods, such as the distribution of royalties 
and the provision of services to 750 beneficiaries, but also the by supporting community 
entrepreneurship and investing in a fund for future use (Holcombe, 2010). 
While conflict still surrounded the negotiation process, the agreement was heralded as a major 
step forward due to the lack of conflict and acceptance within the community compared to previous 
agreements (Senior, 1998). Although the entire process, from the decision to negotiate to the signing 
of the deal was time consuming and costly, it was comparable on both these grounds to historical 
alternative approaches, such as using state legislated power to force development with little 
recognition of community values. This suggested that such a model could be viable for business 
(Senior, 1998). Furthermore, seven years into the agreement, the community agreed to intensify 
mining efforts, which could cut the life time of the mine by 20% or more and exacerbate the strain 
on local resources (Holcombe, 2010). This was received controversially; with some citing it as a 
sign of a good relationship and trust between the company and the community (Senior, 1998) while 
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others feared the prospect of massively increased royalties provided a short term based justification 
for the decision (Holcombe, 2010). 
Holcombe (2010) argued how the community engaged with the mining industry showed the 
community welcomes at least the idea of development within the traditional economy. She asserted 
royalty payments allowed the community a degree of independence, empowering them to develop 
in the manner which they desired. For example, programs aimed at maintaining a traditional way of 
life for a minority within the community, but which benefited the whole through existence, option 
and bequest value, afforded locals the choice of a role in either a traditional lifestyle or the 
neoliberal economy. 
Regardless of the intentions, access to mining royalties benefited the community little. Taylor 
and Scambary (2005) showed that, despite efforts made by mine management, real employment 
within the community had not increased significantly. However, this was contested by the Gumala 
Aboriginal Corporation. Their own study, that did not directly address employment, but which took 
into account cultural characteristics, found members were marginally better employed than non-
members (Holcombe, 2010). Either way, the Indigenous employment figures remained worse than 
those of the non-Indigenous workers in the area. 
Despite the apparent success of the agreement, the Indigenous community still faced major 
social issues. These included, “poor education, health, substance abuse and high interaction with the 
criminal justice system” (Altman, 2009). The degree of separation for standards of living between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, despite the high levels of wealth in the area, prompted 
Scambary to quote local sentiment, “We've got the richest trusts but the poorest people” (as cited in 
Altman, 2009, p. 37). So while the lack of vocal opposition suggested that a social licence to 
operate had been granted by the community, they have benefited little from mining activities. This 
finding aligned with other work (Owen & Kemp, 2013) that showed obtaining a social licence to 




Kemp et al. (2011) argued that community-industry conflict can take a wide range of forms, 
from minor disagreements to violence, and is usually grounded in economic or livelihood disputes. 
Currently, there is conflict with existing agricultural communities regarding the potential impacts of 
the CSG industry upon water and land, resources necessary to sustain an agricultural livelihood. If 
this livelihood were to be significantly damaged, it may destroy a common trait these communities 
share. Wide scale environmental damage may cause the effective destruction of agricultural 
communities in the area, with local people instead identifying themselves with another local 
economic driver. This corroborates with the work of Dalby and Mackenzie (1997) which discussed 
how, in response to a perceived threat, communities can be shaped, fractured or formed. 
Parallels can be drawn, albeit on a subculture level, to the ‘genocidal’ threat the Mirarr people 
described from the Ranger and Jabiluka mines. Both communities rely on the land, the Mirarr 
people spiritually and agricultural communities economically. Each may be adversely affected by 
resource extraction activities to the point of losing community identify. Based on media reports, a 
discourse of marginalisation is evident in some sections of communities impacted by CSG 
extraction and a similar discourse is also evident in publications by the Gundjeihmi Aboriginal 
Corporation (1999). 
A threat may not be the only thing that can achieve this result. Negotiations for the YLUA 
required three separate Traditional Owner groups coming together in a unified stance to negotiate 
with mine management, which could be described as a community identifying with the YLUA. 
Therefore, the act of giving or refusing a social licence to operate has the potential to create or unite 
communities towards a common cause. In essence, the forced response to an external power is a 
shaping factor. However, this is not always positive, as exemplified by the actions of the Mirarr 
people who originally accepted the Ranger mine then reversed their position. 
This case study exhibits both a positive and negative shaping of community. A unity was 
originally created, but was subsequently broken and reshaped through a cycle of conflict. While 
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there is a strong discourse of locals fighting against the CSG industry, there clearly are some within 
the community who feel its effects are positive. However, few media examples are evident in 
comparison to negative views, even in local media sources. This is partially explained by the Rural 
Affairs and Transport References Committee (Rural Affairs and Transport References Committee, 
2011) as a lack of vocal, published expression due to a state of contentedness in regard to these 
parties. If these views are indeed under-represented, and thus presumably more prevalent than is 
evident at the current time, this could mean communities affected by CSG extraction may be more 
likely to enter into damaging cycles of conflict as expressed in the Kakadu region. 
 
Procedural justice 
The debate surrounding water competition, environmental damage and land rights implies 
there is at least concern communities impacted by CSG extraction about the quality of procedural 
justice and their level of decision-making power (Teh-White, 2011). This is exemplified by existing 
power imbalance between the industry and landholders or residents. Due to the importance of the 
industry's macroeconomic contribution to the state and its rapid growth, landholders retain few 
rights to fully reject CSG exploration or extraction, indicating a lack of procedural justice (Rural 
Affairs and Transport References Committee, 2011). This contrasts with the advice from Kellert et 
al. (2000) that identified the importance of: involving local institutions in resource management; 
empowering local authority; reconciling socio-economic development and environmental 
conservation and legitimising local land rights to establish procedural justice. It highlights there is a 
lack of trust between communities and the CSG industry, which is a major obstacle for an industry 
to gain a social licence to operate (Boutilier & Thomson, 2011; Thomson & Boutilier, 2011). 
This outcome is expected, given the perceptions within media that the CSG industry's power 
advantage in land negotiation and water rights marginalises communities with respect to decision-
making. While it is a generalisation of the whole industry, there is at least a basis in truth. In the past, 
CSG companies have not been subject to the same water restrictions as residents in rural 
communities, being able to extract as much water as needed to operate while other landholders are 
subject to increasingly restrictive allocations (Rural Affairs and Transport References Committee, 
2011). Secondly, the use of non-disclosure clauses within land negotiations (Rural Affairs and 
Transport References Committee, 2011) serves to alienate landholders and restrict them from 
communicating their experiences, and ultimately results in conflict, again collaborating with 
previous work in the resource sector (Kellert, et al., 2000). 
Similarities for this point can be drawn with the Ranger and Jabiluka mines. The Fox Report 
was commissioned to advise upon the issues of national importance and community impacts. While 
the finding attempted to balance these interests, the result was a mine development that could not be 
rejected, only objected to, by Traditional Owners. The internal conflict seen today in the region is 
largely due to concerns of the Mirarr people about not being given their true land rights in the initial 
negotiations (Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation, 1999). Like the CSG industry, uranium projects 
were deemed to be of greater importance despite widespread health, environmental and social 
concerns, thus justifying such a marginalisation and allowing development to continue without 
regard to a social licence to operate. 
In contrast, the Yandicoogina mine, although part of a greater interest to Rio Tinto, was not 
deemed sufficiently important enough to provide such justification. At the time Western Australia 
had arguably the weakest native title laws of all the states (Altman, 2009), which essentially granted 
the company the option of developing the mine with comparatively little consideration of social 
issues. Senior (1998) argued the voluntary decision to work with and empower the community to a 
greater extent than required by legislation built the basis for the success of the mine. Not only did 
the company avoid disruptions of project development through conflict, costly both in terms of 
reputation and financial expenses, the good relations built through demonstrated procedural justice 
allowed additional negotiations to occur, resulting in an increase in production (Altman, 2009). 
While there are many other social, cultural and economic issues surrounding the circumstances of 
the case studies, it is clear that a willingness to demonstrate true procedural justice has at least the 
potential to avoid or resolve conflict in the local area. Furthermore, from a business perspective, 
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genuine attempts to engage with the community may result in tangible benefits. Such mutually 
beneficial scenarios are clearly more desirable than those that result in conflict. 
Trust is essential in the community-industry relationship (Boutilier & Thomson, 2011; 
Thomson & Boutilier, 2011) and is pivotal for reducing the chance of conflict. Losing trust in the 
community-industry relationship can lead to long-term issues, even when genuine attempts at 
procedural justice are made. Community trust is difficult to regain and its loss can have negative 
impacts. This is evident in the Ranger and Jabiluka case study, in which the Mirarr people distrusted 
mine management so much that they refused to participate or negotiate with the company. 
Conversely, the community-industry relationship for the Yandicoogina mine appears to be strong, 
with stakeholders working together in relative absence of conflict. In the case of the CSG industry, 
media reports of conflict show that it has not yet been able to gain a significant level of trust. 
 
Distributive justice 
Conflicts regarding distributive justice, as outlined by Kemp et al. (2011), are evident in the 
analysed media and other sources. For example, the Queensland State Government, which regulates 
the majority of CSG extraction in Australia, dictates private royalties for extraction be paid on a 
property level basis (Arrow Energy, 2012; Origin Energy, 2012; Queensland Gas Company, 2010). 
However, the water impacts affecting livelihoods may occur at larger scales, across neighbouring 
properties or the greater community. The Queensland State Government has taken steps towards 
addressing issues of this nature, for example, through the creation of 'make-good' obligations that 
hold companies responsible for any loss of service to existing groundwater bores and requires 
provision of a reasonable quantity and quality of water. However, this system is flawed, applying 
only to bores which are both registered under the Water Act and identified by landholders and 
companies before drilling. 
Property level distribution may be a step closer to equality. However, the benefits to the 
community as a whole remain doubtful. In contrast, the potential for community scale impacts is 
evident, with environmental issues surrounding water potentially leading to broad scale destruction 
of many livelihoods and, in turn, the community identity of the area. The Queensland State 
Government insists the benefits to communities will be seen through increased spending and 
employment within the local area as well as with investments in infrastructure (Department of 
Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, 2011). Economic modelling by McLennan 
Magasanik Associates (2009), on behalf of the Queensland Department of Infrastructure and 
Planning, suggest that construction would be a major source of employment by the industry for 
local communities. However, construction jobs may be highly variable and only demanded for short 
periods, with the modelling predicting a dramatic decline within the next decade. This highlights the 
short-time frame of the CSG industry and shows that communities could be left with all the long-
term negative impacts but few of the benefits, correlating with the work of Ross (1999). 
These effects are seen to varying degrees in the case studies. As with the CSG industry, the 
Ranger, Jabiluka and Yandicoogina mines promised to create employment opportunities and 
invigorate the local economy. In the Kakadu region, poor management, due to cultural differences, 
led to an outcome arguably worse than before the mine was present. Standard socio-economic 
measures of development, such as employment or housing standards, do not show signs of 
improvement and damaging social issues remain prevalent in the area. Using these indicators, it 
would be difficult to argue the benefits and impacts of the Ranger and Jabiluka mines were 
distributed justly. 
Similarly, many of the same social issues are found in the Indigenous communities 
surrounding the Yandicoogina mine. However, there are signs of better resource management by the 
Gumala Aboriginal Corporation. The future fund and small business arm of the corporation both 
provided the potential to stimulate growth and benefit the community after mining activities have 
concluded. However, presently the members of the corporation are only marginally better off than 
non-members. Furthermore, the intensification of activities within the mine significantly shortens 
the life of the mine and, with it, the period in which linkages can be created. 
Similar concerns can be held for the CSG industry, given the forecast of its short lifespan. 
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While such forecasts are speculative, the combination of the short period of time in which to attain 
long-term benefits to communities affected by CSG and the property scale royalty payment system 
represent lost opportunities for communities and industry. As with the Yandicoogina case study, a 
social licence to operate may theoretically be given based on perceptions of benefit rather than 
occurring in practice. If the distributive disparity continues, then the real benefits of the CSG 
industry may pass by, resulting in an outcome in which a social licence to operate may be granted 
even though little benefit to the community was evidenced, as discussed in prior work (Owen & 
Kemp, 2013). This indicates while a social licence to operate may be mutually beneficial to both 
CSG companies and their local community; it is just a first step for longer term mutually beneficial 
outcomes.   
 
CONCLUSION 
As with many resource extraction operations in Australia, the CSG industry is controversial is 
surrounded by a discourse of conflict. Similar discourses have also been evident in other resource 
extraction industries, as the case studies of the Ranger and Jabiluka mines and Yandicoogina mine 
demonstrate. By analysing these case studies, in relation to the provision of a social licence to 
operate, a number of lessons can be learnt that are relevant to the CSG industry. Particularly, the 
provision of a social licence to operate has the potential to be mutually beneficial for both industry 
and affected communities; resource extraction operations can potentially play a major role in 
shaping and forming communities; the role of perceptions, including the perverse nature of bias 
towards both the negative and positive viewpoints, is central to the provision of a social licence to 
operate; and a social licence to operate may not necessarily require procedural or distributive justice 
in order to be granted. However, they play a major role in shaping perceptions and provide an 
avenue for mutual benefits to be realised by both communities and industry. 
These lessons are not new or overly contentious, yet many social licence to operate issues, 
such as power imbalances, benefit and negative impact disparities and a strong tone of conflict, 
remain central to the controversy surrounding the CSG industry. While the CSG industry differs in 
terms of scale and context to other traditional mineral extraction industries, it is critical that this 
type of knowledge and experience be transferred and adapted to the young industry. Failure to do so 
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